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private reprimand, adding that "while petitioner has been
dilatory in attending to his client's litigation, and with particular reference to his failure to supply the missing document, or advise his client or associate counsel of its disappearance, we feel there is no moral turpitude involved, and
. . . we are inclined to believe the neglect in this particular
matter was contributed to by the serious illness at that time
of his wife and the removal of his offices from Tule Lake to
San Francisco." The Board of Governors adopted the committee's findings, but recommended that petitioner be suspended from practice for a period of six months.
We are of the opinion that a reprimand, as recommended by
the local committee, is sufficient discipline under the circumstances, and this opinion shall constitute such reprimand.
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.-The only dereliction of professional duty charged to the petitioner in the findings of
fact made by the local administrative committee and adopted
by the Board of Governors is that he neglected his client's
business. This finding, considered in connection with the
committee's conclusions stated in the form of a "recommendation, " certainly does not show any conduct which justifies
disciplinary action under the rules heretofore laid down by
this court. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Ca1.2d 580 [122 P.2d
549]; Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Ca1.2d 550 [107 P.2d 10];
Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Ca1.2d 17 [63 P.2d 1133] ; Marsh
v. State Bar, 2 Cal.2d 75 [39 P.2d 403] ; Marsh v. State Bar,
210 Cal. 303 [291 P. 583].) Accordingly, in my opinion, the
proceeding should be dismissed.
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[1] Oriminal Law-Justices' Courts-Appeal-Record_Eft'ect of
Delay in Filing.-A superior court has no authority to dismiss
a criminal appeal from a justice's Court on the ground that the
statement on appeal and the transcript had not been filed
within the time required by rules of the Judicial Council,
where the trial court had denied the People's motion to terminate the proceedings on appeal, notwithstanding the fact that
the delay had been occasioned by the appellant's neglect in requesting the preparation of the transcript and. his difficulties
in connection with the fees of the reporters, and where the
trial court's failure to settle the statement and transcript and
to transmit the record to the superior court was not chargeable to the appellant.
[2] Mandamus-Hearing and Determination-Scope of Relief.-

Although a petitioner demands an inappropriate prerogative
writ, the Court may grant such relief as is warranted by the.
facts shown; and where petitioner sought a peremptory writ
of mandate to compel the superior court to hear and determine a criminal appeal, to which he was not entitled because
neither the statement on appeal nor the transcript had been
settled, but he stated facts entitling him to annulment of an
order dismissing the appeal, that relief was granted.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Marin County to hear and determine an appeal from a justice's court. Order dismissing appeal annulled.
Leo R. Friedman for Petitioner.

A. E. Bagshaw for Respondent.
EDMONDS, J.-Following the conviction and sentence of
A. A. Sekt in the Justice's Court of San Rafael, he med a
(1] See 8 Oal.Jur. 676.

McK. Dig. Reference: (1] Criminal Law, § 1509; [2] Mandamus,
§ 100.
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written notice of appeal. Upon motion, the superior court
dismissed the appeal upon the ground that it had not been
perfected within the time required by the rules of the J udicial Council. The question for decision, presented by the
petition of Sekt for a writ of mandate requiring the superior
court to hear and determine the appeal, concerns the authority of that court to make the challenged order.
The petitioner filed his notice of appeal on March 30th.
On the same day he was granted until April 19th within
which to prepare and file a statement and the transcript on
appeal. The twenty days fixed by this order is the maximum
time which may be allowed by the justice's court for the
preparation of the record upon aweal. (Rules of the Judicial Council in the matter of Criminal Appeals to the Superior Court from Inferior Courts; rules 4 and 6.) On
April 24th, five days late, the petitioner filed his statement
upon appeal specifying the ground, among others, that the
evidence is insufficient to support either the verdict or the
judgment. The statement declares that the insufficiency of
the evidence is disclosed by the transcript of the evidence
and proceedings had at the trial which "has been filed in
said cause and said transcript by this reference is included
in and made a part of this statement on appeaL"
It appears from the stipulation of the District Attorney of
Marin County and counsel for Sekt, upon which the superior
court determined the motion to dismiss, that at the time the
statement on appeal was filed the reporter's transcript had
not been prepared. Because of the delay in filing the transcript, on May 14th the district attorney moved the justice's
court to terminate all proceedings upon the appeal and to
carry the judgment into effect. The motion was denied.
Other facts shown by the stipuiation are that, on May 24th,
the transcript prepgred by them was filed in the superior
court. Four days later, counsel for Sekt served a notice stating that on May 24th the transcript had been filed in the
justice's court.
It was on May 27th that the district attorney served and
filed in the superior court a notice of motion to dismiss the
appeal. Later he served an amended notice of his intention
to make such a motion upon the ground that Sekt had failed
to file his statement upon appeal or a transcript of the evidence and proceedillgs as required by law. The motion, baSed'
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upon the notice as amended, was heard and determined on
June 18th. The parties' stipulation recites that the transcript remained on file in the superior court until shortly
prior to the date of the hearing when it was withdrawn and
filed with the justice's court. So far as the record shows,
neither the statement nor the transcript has been Rettled.
The petitioner contends that the rules of the Judicial Council are not jurisdictional and a failure to comply with them
does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to hear
an appeal from an inferior court upon the merits where
noncompliance is excusable. He urges that he has done all
in his power to perfect the appeal and should not be penalized for delay based upon orders of the justice's court extending time occasioned by the irregular extensions of time granted
by the justice's court to its official reporter. It is the duty
of the trial court, he concludes, to determine whether delay
justifies a termination of the proceedings to procure a record,
and in the present case that question has been determined favorably to the petitioner.
In support of its order, the respondent court asserts that
because of the petitioner's failure to file the statement on
appeal and the transcript within the time provided by the
rules of the Judicial Council it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. But if compliance with the rules of the
Judicial Council is not jurisdictional, it adds, the order
granting the motion to dismiss was made in the exercise of
its ,discretion to dismiss an appeal not prosecuted diligently
or regularly, as authorized by rule 10, and that there was no
abuse of discretion.
Rule 4 of the rules of the Judicial Council regulating appeals to the superior court in criminal cases, requires that
the statement and transcript upon appeal must be served upon
the respondent and filed with the trial court within five dayS
after the filing of the notice of appeal. But by rule 6, the
court from which the appeal is taken may extend the time
for filing the statement and transcript to a maximum of
twenty days from the date upon which the notice of appeal
was filed. "As soon as the statement or transcript on appeal
has been settled and certified," the rules further provide,
"the clerk of the trial court or the judge thereof. if there
be no clerk, shall forthwith transmit the record on appeal to
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the clerk of the Superior Court to which the appeal is taken,
together with all exhibits or other documents properly referred to and identified in the statement or transcript."
(Rule 3, § 9.) In the present case the transcript was not
filed with the trial court within the time specified by these
provisions, nor even within the time as extended by the order
made in violation of rule 6. But that court denied the People's motion to terminate the proceedings upon appeal;
whether it has settled either the statement or transcript does
110t appear. At the time the motion to dismiss the appeal
was noticed, and also when it was heard and determined by
the respondent court, the transcript had not been transmitted
as required by rule 3.
The rules of the Judicial Council authorize the dismissal
of an appeal under these circumstances: "If the appeal is
not brought to a hearing within the time limited, or the
appellant otherwise fails to prosecute it with diligence, or if
the appeal is irregular in any substantial respect, the Superior Court may, on motion of the respondent or on its own
motion, after written notice to the appellant, order it dismissed." (Rule 10.) But the singular situation here shown
is that although, according to the return of the superior court,
at the time the motion to dismiss the appeal was heard and
determined there was pending before it the appeal taken by
Sekt, the record upon appeal had not been settled and the
trial court had denied a motion to terminate the proceedings
for obtaining it.
The rules regulating appeals from the superior court which
were superseded by the Rules on Appeal, effective July 1,
1943, authorized the dismissal of an appeal upon the failure
to file the record within the specified time. But under the
former procedure, a motion of the respondent must have
been based upon a certificate or affidavit" that no proceeding
for a bill of exceptions or transcript under section 953a is
pending in the trial court, and if no such proceeding was
ever instituted that the time to institute the same has expired. " (Rule VI, Rules for Supreme Court and District
Courts of Appeal.) The theory underlying this practice and
the rules of court which have been in effect from time to
time is that ordinarily whether the appellant has taken action to perfect his appeal within due time is not a question
for investigation and consideration in this court on amotion
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to dismiss the appeal. Such matters, it has been pointed out,
may more properly be determined in the superior court.
(Mill Valley v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 189 Cal. 52 [207 P.
253] .) Accordingly, an order of the superior court denying
a motion to terminate proceedings to procure a record is
usually upheld. (Smith v. Jaccard, 20 Cal.App. 280 [128
P. 1023, 1026].) "The question of whether due diligence
has been exercised is one that necessarily rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court and its determination of this
question will not be disturbed unless it plainly appears that
such discretion has been abused." (Wood v. Peterson Farms
00., 131 Cal.App. 312, 315 [21 P.2d 468].)
These principles are applicable to the facts which were
presented to the superior court upon the motion to dismiss.
True, it appears that there had been a long delay, occasioned
by Sekt's neglect in requesting the preparation of the transcript and his difficulties in connection with the fees of the
reporters. But his inattention had been excused by the trial
court. Moreover, the trial court's failure to settle the statement and transcript and to transmit the record to the superior court, so far as appears in the present proceeding, is not
chargeable to the appellant., The motion to dismiss the appeal should, therefore, have been denied.
[2] Nevertheless, it is obvious that a peremptory writ of
mandate requiring the superior court to hear and determine
the appeal should not issue when neither the statement nor the
transcript has been settled by the justice's court and it is
conceivable that the record on appeal may never be transmitted to the superior court. On the other hand, the challenged order effectively bars any consideration of the appeal
if, as and when the record is transmitted by the trial court.
The petitioner has therefore stated facts entitling him to an
annulment of the order dismissing the appeal (Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 405 [106 P.2d 411] ; Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 262 [89 P.2d 109]). For
although a petitioner demands an inappropriate prerogative
writ, the court should grant such relief as is warranted by the
facts shown. (Van Tiger v. Superior Court, 7 Ca1.2d 377,
384 [60 P.2d 851] ; Traffic Truck Sales Co. v. Justice's Court,
192 Cal. 377, 381 [220 P. 306]; Van Hoosear v. ROIilroad
Commission, 189 Cal. 228, 236 [207 P. 903].)
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The alternative writ of mandate is discharged; the order
dismissing the appeal is annulled.
Curtis, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I concur. The essential jurisdictional
step in taking an appeal to the superior court is the filing of
a notice of appeal within the time limited (rule 2, Criminal
Appeals to the Superior Court*) but the record shall not be
transmitted to the superior court unless and until it is settled as provided by the rules (rules 3 and 8, Criminal Appeals to the Superior Court*). The filing of the notice of
appeal with the trial court within the time prescribed is
jurisdictional and, even though the notice of appeal is filed
in time, the appellant may lose his right to have the record
transmitted to the higher court, but until the record is transmitted, the superior court ordinarily will be in no position
to entertain and pass upon a motion to dismiss. There is rio
absolute time limit fixed for the perfecting and settlement
of the record (rule 7, Criminal Appeals to the Superior
Court*) and upon the showing before us it does not appear
that the superior court had authority to dismiss the appeal;
the trial court had denied the respondent's motion to termi~
nate the proceedings therein and that order is not subject
to review in this proceeding. For a further discussion of the
rules in question see People v. Carpenter (1939), 36 Cal.App.
2d Supp. 760 [93 P.2d 276].
Shenk, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. I subsC'rihf' to the view that
appeals should, if possible, be heard on the merits; and that
a dismissal for procedural default should only be ordered
where the appellant is clearly at fault. If a motion to dismiss
an appeal were made in this court under circumstances similar to those shown by the record herein, denial of the motion
would be reasonable, despite the fact that much of the delay
was caused by appellant's own neglect in failing to commence proceedings promptly, and to his subsequf'ntIy delivering bad checks to the reporter as ad vances on his fees. That
this is a criminal appeal, that eventually appellant paid the
-The' rules govern~ng criminal appeals to the superior court
referred to above' ate those' which were in force at the time this
proceeding originated.
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reporter's fees, and that subsequent delays in settlement and
certification of the record were not within his power to avoid,
would ordinarily be persuasive reasons for leniency in ruling on the motion.
These considerations, however, are not before us. The
motion to dismiss was not addressed to this court, and we are
not deciding it. The motion was addressed to the superior
court, in which the appeal was pending, and was granted by
that court. We have recently pointed out that "the jurisdictiooi of the superior court upon an appeal from a proc('ed.
ing in a justice's court was the same as that of any appellate
court unless the superior court sought to conduct a new trial. "
(Portnoy v. Superior Oourt, 20 Cal.2d 375, 377 [125 P.2d
487], restating the holding in Redlands High School Dist. v.
Superior Oourt, 20 Ca1.2d 348 [125 P.2d 490].) Since the
superior court in appeals from justices' courts is in fact an
appellate court, with the usual appellate jurisdiction. its
judgments of affirmance, reversal, or dismissal within its
jurisdiction are free from review in another appellate court.
There is no provision, by statute or rule, fora further appeal
to or hearing in this court; and the determination by the
superior court that the appellant was guilty of inexcusable
neglect,' even if regarded as erroneous or harsh, was no more
our concern than its determination of any substantive question of law or fact. Our procedural system does not provide
for an ultimate right of review of every controversy in this
court, but instead gives finality to decisions of the various
appellate courts, except in the situations in which hearings
in the Supreme Court are permitted after decisions by the
, District Court of Appeal.
All this is implied in the majority decision and opinion,
'which treats the application herein as a petition for a writ
: of certiorari, and grants relief by annulling the order of dis. missal. The opinion therefore holds that the superior court
exceeded its jurisdiction in making that order, notwithstand'ing the fact that the appellant was· admittedly guilty of
, neglect and improper conduct in the proceedings for prep, aration of the record, and that the sole questioI1 was whether
the resulting delays should be excused., The failure of another appellate court to exercise leniency in favor of a· defaulting appellant can hardly be regarded as in excess of its
juril,;diction. In the light of all of the facts disclosed, it can-
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not even be said with assurance that the superior court exercised its discretion unwisely.
The majority opinion nevertheless purports to find the
superior court lacking in jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal
by reason of the absence of an order of the trial (justice's)
court "terminating proceedings for a record." It is said that
the question whether the appellant is in default is one for
the trial court and not for the appellate court to determine.
If this view is correct, an important part of its appellate
jurisdiction has been stripped from the appellate court, and
given to justices of the peace, who are, in many cases, not
lawyers. They may countenance delay of months-perhaps
years-without any control by the superior court. Before we
accept any such theory we ought to be assured that the law
plainly demands it. Actually, the, law is clearly to the contrary.
The former rule governing appeals to the Supreme Court
or District Court of Appeal was that a motion to dismiss for
failure to file a record would not be considered unless a
motion to terminate proceedings for a record had first been
made in the trial court and granted by that court. The rea·
son was that the former Supreme Court rules fixed no time
for filing of the record on appeal, and expressly made an
order of termination a prerequisite to the motion to dismiss.
(Former Supreme Court rule I, § 1, and rule VI; see Hahnemann v. Pacific G. & E. 00., 31 Cal.App.2d 692 [88 P.2d
748]; Orocker v. Orocker, 76 Cal.App. 606 [245 P. 438].)
The procedure on a motion to terminate, and the incidental
appeal from an order of termination (see W.ood v. Peterson
Farms 00., 214 Cal. 94 [3 P.2d 922] ; How"tand v. Howland,
11 Cal.2d 20 [77 P.2d 475]) was a serious cause of delay ill
the prosecution of appeals, and was eliminated from the new
Rules on Appeal recently adopted by the Judicial Council
(See Judicial Council Annotated Rules, p. 45; Witkin, Ne'lll
OaUfornia Rules on A.ppeal, 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 79, 127.)
The rules governing criminal appeals from inferior courts
to the superior court do not establish this procedure, either
expressly or by implication. The attempt to apply it herein
is by analogy only, and any justification for its introduction
disappeared when the new Rules on Appeal were adopted.
Rule 10(a) of the rules governing appeals to the superior
court provides that if "the appellant otherwise fails to prosecute it with diligence .•. the Superior Court may, on motion
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of the respondent or on its own motion, after written notice
to the appellant, order it dismissed." Nothing is said therein
about a motion to terminate proceedings. Yet the majority
opinion, without explanation, not only imposes on the superior
court a procedure already abandoned in the other appellate
courts, but makes that outmoded procedure jurisdictional.
Neither reason nor authority can be found to sustain' this
decision.
If the superior court should arbitrarily dismiss an appeal
where the uncontroverted evidence clearly established.compliance by the. appellant with all applicableruies,.we.:rm.ght
hold that its act was an unwarrantedrefusaltoasSri.niejuiis~ .
diction, and issue mandate to compel it ,to. hear,.'tb.ecause.
But where, as here, the record contains some ~:videncl},'of lack
of diligence in prosecution of the appeal, the igranting, or re~
fusing relief to the appellant lie~ with the court to which the
appeal was taken. If the rule for which this case stands were
to be followed, every litigant whose' appeal wa.~(dismissed. for
lack of diligent prosecution, in the superior' court or' appel.
late department thereof, or in anyDistrictC.~tii',(ofAppeal,
would be entitled to a writ of review in this court,for
purpose of determining whether the facts juStified the dismissal of the appeal.

the

[L. A. No. 18736. In Bank. Apr. 6, 1944.]

VERA LAWLESS, Appellant, v. A. A. CALAWAY, et aI.,
Res~ondents..
[1] Physicians-Malpractice-Standard of Care.~A physician or
surgeon is required only to have the degree of learning and
skill ordinarily possessed by practitioners of the medical profession in the same locality, and to exercise ordinary care
McK. Dig. References: [1] Physicians and Surgeons, § 51(1);
[2,10] Physicians and Surgeons, § 52(1); [3,7,13,14] Physicians
and Surgeons, § 56(2); [4,5, 8J Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(3);
[6] Physicians and Surgeons, § 52; [9] X-rays; [11] Witnesses,
§ 93(1); [12] Physicians and Surgeons, § 56(1); [15] Appeal and
Error, § 184; [16] Physicians and Surgeons, § 62; [17] Appeal and
Error, § 188.
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